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Abstract
We analyze the trade-oﬀs faced by a monetary policy authority when the
value added tax rate is increased. In the short run, such an increase acts as
a cost push shock from the perspective of a central bank that is concerned
with stabilizing the welfare relevant output gap. We develop a New Keynesian
monetary model with real wage rigidity and consider the eﬀects that obtain
under a simple interest rate rule, on the one hand, and those that obtain under
an optimal monetary policy from a timeless perspective (in the terminology of
Woodford, 2003). The implications for the dynamic response of the economy
diﬀer strongly in the presence of real wage rigidity. While under a rule inﬂation
is higher for about eight quarters, the optimal policy involves an adjustment
that is about half as long, and is followed by a slight deﬂation. The reason is
that this policy can be shown to include a commitment to maintain a certain
price-level, which contains inﬂation expectations. In the absence of real wage
rigidity, however, output would initially only fall by about half as much.
Keywords: Nominal and real rigidities, distortionary taxation, optimal
monetary policy
11 Introduction
This paper analyzes the optimal monetary policy response to a change in the value-
added tax in a New Keynesian dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE)
model with rigid real wages. Because it constitutes a cost-push shock in the Phillips
curve, such a tax increase confronts the monetary authority with a trade-oﬀ between
output and inﬂation stabilization. We consider two types of systematic responses
of a central bank. One is a simple Taylor-type interest rate rule, under which the
nominal interest rate is adjusted proportional to deviations of inﬂation from target
and to variations of the welfare-relevant output gap. The other type of response
is a targeting rule that results from the optimal monetary policy under a timeless
perspective.1
The framework we employ is the standard new Keynesian model with a value
added tax on the revenue of the monopolistically competitive ﬁrms. In the baseline
case, the revenue is reimbursed as a lump sum to the households, or equivalently,
is used by the government on the same bundle of diﬀerentiated goods as that of
households. Thus the only long-run eﬀect of the tax is distortionary. Price stickiness
is modelled as a quadratic cost of price adjustment on the gross price that ﬁrms
charge to consumers. The model is complemented by introducing real wage rigidities
in a simple manner following Krause and Lubik (2003) and Blanchard and Gali
(2005). It is well-known that real rigidities add important inertia to the real marginal
costs faced by ﬁrms, and hence aﬀect inﬂation dynamics. We thus assume that
current real wages are a weighted average between last period’s wages (in discrete
time) and the current marginal rate of substitution. Since real wages are prevented
from fully adjusting downward after the fall in revenue due to the tax increase, the
real marginal costs of ﬁrms rise. This confounds the policy problem, as the initial
output response to a tax change is greatly ampliﬁed.
We ﬁnd in the calibrated model that an interest rate rule implies an increase
in inﬂation after the tax change, which slowly peters out. After about 8 quarters,
inﬂation is back to steady state. Output falls on impact and then needs about the
same time to revert back upwards to the new long-run level of output. However, this
level is lower than initially, because the tax change raises the degree of distortion
in the economy. Under an optimal monetary policy from the timeless perspective,
the central bank commits to a price level (or price level path). This target makes
sure that agents’ inﬂation expectations are ﬁrmly anchored, such that stabilizing
monetary policy can be conducted with a minimal loss in welfare. However, relative
to the rule, output falls less on impact, falls further in the second quarter, but then
quickly reverts back to the new steady state. From a welfare point of view, this
1See Woodford (2003).
2outcome is be preferred as the adjustment of output and inﬂation is faster. Note
that in the absence of real wage rigidity, the inﬂation response under both regimes
is basically zero as the transition to the new long-run equilibrium can take place
instantaneously.
The choice of optimal monetary policy involves two issues. First is to decide on
the relevant notion of output gap, which the central bank aims to minimize along
with inﬂation variations. This is reﬂected in the quadratic objective function of the
central bank. The second issue is to ﬁnd the correct, model-consistent objective
function, in particular the determinants of the coeﬃcients on the quadratic devia-
tion of the output gap and the quadratic deviations of inﬂation from their respective
target values.2 This can only be determined from an, at least, second-order approxi-
mation of household utility, in order to obtain a linear-quadratic policy problem. We
derive such an approximation. Loss functions speciﬁed in an ad-hoc fashion, often
employ the gap between actual output and the natural rate of output. The latter
is deﬁned as the level of output that would obtain in the absence of price rigidities.
However, the welfare-relevant output gap is given by the diﬀerence between actual
output and the eﬃcient level of output. In a world with distortions, the two concepts
of the output gap diﬀer, and it is variations of the second one that the central bank
should consider. In both the case of a rule and that with optimal policy, we use the
welfare-relevant output gap.3
The next section outlines the model and discusses the appropriate notion of the
output gap. Section 3 derives the model-endogenous objective function, with respect
to which optimal monetary policy under a timeless perspective is derived in section
4. Based on calibrated parameters, section 5 shows quantitative results, section 6
concludes.
2See also the discussion in Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (1999).
3The study by Nessen and Soderstrom (2001) is also concerned with diﬀerent variants of mon-
etary policy responses to (among other things) value-added tax increases. They, however, work
within the class of simple rules which are chosen optimally with respect to diﬀerent ad-hoc speciﬁ-
cations of the loss function.
32 The model economy
2.1 Households, ﬁrms, government
The basic model is a version of the cashless economy as in Woodford (2003).4 House-
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Real household spending consists of consumption C and bond purchases where B is
nominal bond holdings and P is the price level. Real income is the sum of a lump-
sum transfer T, wage income WN, the interest income on bonds bought last period,
and dividend income D. The nominal one-period interest rate is i. Consumption is
a CES aggregate of diﬀerentiated products,
Ct =





which gives rise to demand functions for each individual good, with ǫ > 1. The
wage, prices, and interest rate are taken as given by households.






























the quadratic cost of price adjustment, and τ denotes the value-added tax rate.
Proﬁts are discounted with the household’s subjective discount factor, and are







arising from consumer optimization. The linear production technology is given by
Yit = AtNit.
where A is aggregate productivity.
4Our set up diﬀers from his by introducing price rigidity via convex adjustment costs a la
Rotemberg (1982) as opposed to using Calvo-type price setting.
4The government collects the tax revenue which is reimbursed to the household





That is, the government runs a balanced budget each period. The economy is
cashless, so there is no seignorage revenue.
The policy instrument at the disposal of the central bank is the one-period
interest rate i. As discussed in more detail below, this will either be set according
to a central bank reaction function or its evolution will be determined such that it
supports the optimally chosen paths of inﬂation and output.
2.2 Optimality conditions and steady state
Household maximization yields a consumption Euler equation and a labor supply
condition,
C−σ












as well as the associated transversality condition. Firms’ proﬁt maximization results
in a labor demand equation and a price setting equation. Real marginal revenue ϕt






In equilibrium, Pit = Pt, by symmetry. The resulting price setting equation then
determines inﬂation as a function of expected inﬂation and current real marginal
costs as well as the eﬀect on revenue arising from changes in the tax:
ψ (πt − π)πt = βEt
λt+1
λt
ψ (πt+1 − π)πt+1
Yt+1
Yt











Using the fact that A = 1 in steady state, so that N = Y , and the fact that C = Y
in equilibrium, this implies a condition on steady state output
ϕ = W = CσN  = Y σ+ .
Real marginal cost being equal to the real wage in steady state, labor supply deter-
mines aggregate output. A higher tax rate implies a lower real wage and thus lower
labor supply. This is the distortionary eﬀect of the value added tax.
52.2.1 Log-linearized version of the model
The ﬁrst-order log-linearization of the model’s equilibrium conditions delivers the
core equations of the standard New Keynesian model. In the following, a variable
with “hat” denotes its log-deviations from its log steady state value, i.e.
ˆ Zt = logZt − logZ.
The consumption Euler equation linearizes to an expectational IS curve that gives
output as a function of expected output and the ex-ante real interest rate,
  Yt = Et   Yt+1 −
1
σ
(it − Et  πt+1).
The price setting equation becomes the familiar New Keynesian Phillips curve with
one new component, the change in the tax rate,
  πt = βEt  πt+1 + κ
 






where we deﬁne κ = 1
ψ
ǫ−1
1+τ. Real marginal cost evolve as
  ϕt =   Wt −   At,
and labor supply is
  Wt = σ   Yt +     Nt.
Note also that   Yt =   Ct since the price adjustment costs are zero to a ﬁrst order.
Using the linearized production function,   Yt =   Nt +   At, the latter condition can be
written as   Wt = (σ +  )  Yt −     At which will be used below.
One can see from the Phillips curve that the response of inﬂation after a tax
change depends on the behavior of real marginal costs. These in turn depend on
real wages. It will turn out that without real wage rigidity, real wages immediately
fall to reach the new allocation, and thus real marginal cost fall by exactly same
amount the tax increases inﬂationary pressure. Hence, inﬂation stays constant.
Finally, the stochastic processes for deviations of technology and the tax rate
from their respective steady states are speciﬁed as
ˆ At = ρA ˆ At−1 + ǫA
t
and




t are white noise shocks.5 Tax changes are usually consid-
ered as permanent in nature. However, following the literature we approximate them
5Other exogenous shocks, e.g. to labor supply or the discount factor could be introduced but
are not central to the problem considered here.
6as a highly persistent process, i.e. ρτ will be smaller than but close to unity. Note
that this can be interpreted as agents having approximately a no-change perception
with respect to next period’s tax rate, since
Et (ˆ τt+1) ≈ ˆ τt.
An alternative strategy would consist of modeling the tax rate evolution as a random
walk. This, however, would make it necessary to rewrite the system with reference
to this stochastic trend.
72.3 The natural rate of output and the eﬃcient level of output
The natural rate of output is the equilibrium level of output that obtains in the
absence of nominal price rigidities.6 It can be found by maximizing household util-






1+τt −WtNt subject to the demand and production functions. In this case,
the real wage is equal to the marginal product of labor, including taxes, or in lin-
earized form,   Wt =   At − τ
1+τ   τt. Equalizing to the marginal rate of substitution of
labor above yields an equation for the natural rate of output,
  Y n
t =
1 +  
σ +  
  At −
1




Note that the natural rate is not a constant, or, in a model with technological
progress, on a smooth trend. Instead, the natural rate of output can ﬂuctuate
strongly in response to real shocks, as the technology and tax shocks included here.
Corresponding to the expectational IS equation, the real equilibrium features an
Euler equation given by
  Y n





where ρ is the natural real rate of interest, or in Woodford’s terminology, the Wick-
sellian interest rate. Movements in the natural rate can be expressed in terms of
changes in technology and taxes,
ˆ ρt =
σ
  + σ
 
(1 +  )(ρA − 1) ˆ At −
τ
1 + τ
(ρτ − 1)ˆ τt
 
.
This level of output however, is not the ﬁrst-best, eﬃcient level that the central
bank should aim to be ‘close’ to, and which would maximize household welfare.
That output level is given by the allocation that would obtain in the absence of any
distortion, including the one arising from taxes. It is given by
  Y ∗
t =
1 +  
σ +  
  At
and the associated Euler equation is
  Y ∗









σ(1 +  )
σ +  
(ρA − 1) ˆ At
is the real rate of interest associated with the eﬃcient equilibrium. One can see that
only technology shocks move the eﬃcient level of output as they change the econ-
omy’s production possibility frontier. Tax changes have no eﬀect, even though they
6This is the deﬁnition of Woodford (2003) and others.
8change the allocation of resources. The optimal monetary policy under commitment
will however not aim to reach the eﬃcient level of output all the time, as might be
expected. However, the optimal response of the central bank to disturbances will be
aﬀected by the distortionary taxes and the monopolistic distortion, as we elaborate
below.
2.4 The system in terms of the welfare-relevant output gap
As the central bank will want to target the eﬃcient level of output, it is useful to
transform the system in terms of the deviation of actual output from the eﬃcient
level of output. In the literature, the employed output gap is often that between
actual output and the natural rate of output. This is only valid when the distortions
in the economy are small, or ideally, oﬀset by a subsidy by the government that
oﬀsets this distortion. However, this is not possible in our analysis that explicitly
considers an additional distortion, namely the value added tax.
The deﬁnition of real marginal costs and the labor supply equation allow a
transformation of the Phillips curve. Using the results from above, real marginal
cost can be written as
  ϕt = (σ +  )  Yt − (1 +  )   At.
Substituting into the Phillips curve yields
  πt = βEt  πt+1 + κ
 






Now use the expression of ﬁrst best output to substitute out (1 +  )   At. Therefore,
deﬁning   xt =   Yt −   Y ∗
t ,




This expression shows clearly the role of changes of the value added tax as cost push
shocks. It arises from the presence of a wedge between the natural rate and the
eﬃcient rate of output. Finally, the IS curve can be re-expressed accordingly
  xt = Et  xt+1 −
1
σ
(it − Et  πt+1 −   ρ∗
t)
where   ρ∗
t is given above.
For a given interest rate, a tax increase increases inﬂation, and through the
Fisher equation, lowers the real interest rate. This would raise the output gap, and
hence output. However, when the interest rate rises by more than inﬂation, the
output gap falls.
92.5 Introducing real wage rigidity
We introduce real wage rigidity that prevents instantaneous real adjustment after
a tax shock. The real wage is formed as a convex combination of the previous
period’s real wage and the ‘notional’ real wage which is given by the marginal rate
of substitution,7
ˆ Wt = γ ˆ Wt−1 + (1 − γ)   mrst
where γ ∈ [0,1] is the adjustment parameter. With γ = 0 we obtain the economy
in its basic form as outlined above. The derivation of the equations describing the
economy follow the same lines as in the case without real wage rigidity. The main
point to observe is the form of the Phillips curve that now features a backward-
looking term and an endogenous forecast error. We have
  πt =
β
1 + γβ
Et  πt+1 +
γ
1 + γβ
  πt−1 +
1 − γ
1 + γβ








(ˆ τt − γˆ τt−1) − γ
 
ˆ At − ˆ At−1
  
+ ηt
with ηt = ˆ πt−Et−1ˆ πt. The IS equation has the same form as before, with a suitable
modiﬁcation of the real interest rate.
3 Utility-based welfare criterion
The model is not closed without an equation determining the nominal interest rate.
One possibility is to specify an interest rate rule that yields the interest rate as
a function of endogenous variables, such as the targets inﬂation and the output
gap. Often this is assumed in an ad hoc manner, when the focus is mainly on
characterizing the economy’s dynamic response to shocks. However, our goal here is
to understand the optimal response of monetary policy to a value added tax change.
Therefore, we need to start from ﬁrst principles, derive an welfare criterion the
central bank is to maximize and then ﬁnd the optimal choice of the instrument.8
The goal of the derivation that follows is a discounted loss function of the form
∞  
t=0





(˜ xt − x∗)




that approximates the stream of the household’s utilities.
The general strategy is to take a second order approximation of the household’s
objective function in terms of aggregate variables the central bank is concerned
7Expressed in levels, the prevailing real wage is thus a geometric average of the two components.
8See in particular Benigno and Woodford (2005) and Walsh (2005).
10about, such as output and inﬂation. Then this quadratic approximation together
with the linearly approximated economic system constitute a linear-quadratic prob-
lem that can be solved with standard techniques. A little bit of judgement goes into
the choice of variables. The problem is that the quadratic cost of inﬂation drop out
in a linear system, so one wants to substitute it into the function of which a sec-
ond order approximation is taken. A quadratic approximation of the whole system
would of course circumvent this issue, but at the cost of increased complexity and
computational burden.
With the aggregate resource constraint, derived from the household budget con-
straint in equilibrium, welfare can be expressed in terms of output and inﬂation.
The income identity and production function are






where the second term in the ﬁrst equation shows the resources lost from adjusting
prices, and A and N are technology and labor input respectively. Solving for C and
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This is the function of which a second-order approximation is to be obtained. It is
expressed in two variables, output and inﬂation.
It is convenient to ﬁrst take a second-order Taylor approximation of utility in
terms of absolute deviations, and then transform into deviations in terms of loga-
rithms.9 That is, use
  Zt = Zt − Z ≈ Z
 







  Zt = logZt − logZ.
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while the approximation of the second term is
[Yt/At]
1+ 
1 +  
≈ Y 1+ A−(1+ )
 
  Yt +
1
2
(1 +  )  Y 2




11where all terms of order higher than 2 have been dropped as they are small.
In the standard, distortion free case – i.e., without taxes and without real wage
rigidity – the marginal rate of substitution for labor equals N Cσ and the marginal
product of labor is A. Hence N Cσ = A. Inserting the production function, and the
fact that in steady state, Y = C, yields Y σ+  = A1+  or
ǫ − 1
ǫ
Y 1−σ = (1 − Φ)Y 1−σ = Y 1+ A−(1+ ),
where




Thus, the objective function becomes
U ≈ Y 1−σ
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1
2
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  Y 2
t + 2Φ
1 +  
σ +  
  Yt   At
 
The next step in the derivation depends on how large the distortion Φ is. If the
distortion is suﬃciently small, second order terms Φ  Y 2
t and Φ  Yt   At are small enough
to be ignored.10 So one can write a loss function
Loss ≈ Y 1−σ1
2
(σ +  )
 
  Y 2
t − 2
 
Φ + (1 +  )   At
σ +  
 
  Yt +
ψπ2





The ﬁnal step is to rewrite this expression in terms of the output gap. First, note
that the log deviation of the natural rate of output, when prices are ﬂexible, as well
as the log deviation of the eﬃcient level of output, is given by
  Y n
t =   Y ∗
t =
1 +  
σ +  
  At
That is, while the two diﬀer in the steady state, they comove proportionally about
the steady state. Namely, for the steady state, we have Y = (1 − Φ)1/(σ+ ) and
Y ∗ = 1, so that log(Y ∗/Y ) ≈ Φ/(σ +  ) ≡ x∗. Then the term
  Y 2
t − 2
 
Φ + (1 +  )   At
σ +  
 
  Yt
can be written as
  Y 2
t − 2
Φ
σ +  
  Yt − 2  Y ∗
t   Yt
10With this assumption, we follow Woodford (2003), chapter 6, section 3.2, and Walsh (2003),
chapter 11.
12and is approximately equal to
 
  Yt −   Y ∗
t −
Φ
σ +  
 2
where a host of interaction terms independent of monetary policy have been ignored.
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with ˜ xt =   Yt −   Y ∗
t . That is, for the discounted expected loss function anticipated in
the beginning we have Ω = ¯ Y 1−σ 1
2(σ +  ) and λ = ψσ2/(σ +  ).
While the monopolistic distortion is constant at all times, the distortion arising
from taxes is time-varying. As for the steady state distortion, one obtains






which will still assumed to be small. The natural rate of output will now diﬀer from
the eﬃcient rate. However, the expression for the period loss function can be written
in terms of eﬃcient output in exactly the same way as before. Since the eﬃcient
level of output is not aﬀected by the presence of real wage rigidity, the same result
applies to that scenario as well.
4 Monetary policy
We will consider two types of monetary policy behavior in our model. The ﬁrst is a
simple interest rule of the Taylor type which however uses the ‘appropriate’ output
gap. Thus, the model is closed by an equation for the one-period interest rate of the
form
it = φπˆ πt + φx˜ xt.
The second is optimal behavior under a timeless perspective as outlined in Wood-
ford (2003). The central bank minimizes the loss function derived above subject to
the constraints resulting from linearized optimality conditions of households’ and
ﬁrms’ behavior, i.e. the linearized IS and Phillips curve equation.
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13where the Phillips curve and expectational IS curve have been added as constraints.





which implies that the ﬁrst constraint is not binding.11 The other two ﬁrst order
conditions are
E0[λˆ πt + φt − φt−1] = 0
E0[(˜ xt − x∗) − φtκ(σ +  )] = 0
for all t. From that one obtains
  πt = −
1
κ(σ +  )λ
(˜ xt − ˜ xt−1)
for all t. Thus, the optimal commitment solution is necessarily backward looking.
The latter relationship, added to the IS and Phillips curve equations, leads to a full
speciﬁcation of the joint behavior of output, inﬂation and the interest rate. However,
using the latter equation to eliminate inﬂation from the Phillips curve, one can also
obtain an expectational diﬀerence equation for the optimal path of ˜ xt. This in turn
has a solution of the form
˜ xt = ax˜ xt−1 + bxˆ τt
with the coeﬃcients being functions of the structural parameters. This ﬁnally allows
to express inﬂation in terms of the lagged output gap and the tax shock. It should
also be noted that optimal policy behavior from a timeless perspective can alterna-
tively be expressed in terms of an interest rate reaction function. This would make
the interest rate a function of the natural real rate of interest, expected inﬂation,
the expected output gap, the lagged output gap, and the tax shock.
For the case with real wage rigidity, we have the same objective function of the
central bank as shown above. However, since the Phillips curve has a diﬀerent form
in that case, the constraint in the Lagrangian changes. Knowing already that the
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where Ht collects terms with technology and tax shocks that will be irrelevant for
the ﬁrst order conditions.
The ﬁrst order conditions now become
E0
 













(˜ xt − x∗) − φt
1
1 + γβ
κ(σ +  )
 
= 0




κ(σ +  )(1 − γ)λ
[(1 + γβ)˜ xt − ˜ xt−1 − βγEt˜ xt+1].
We thus obtain the interesting result that the backward- and forward-looking nature
of the ‘hybrid’ Phillips curve arising from real wage rigidity is inherited by the
expression for inﬂation in terms of the output gap. This is an implication of the
optimal monetary policy under a timeless perspective.
5 Calibration and Results
We numerically solve for the rational expectations equilibrium of the linearized
model along the lines of Sims (2002). For the solution, parameter values need to
be assigned. We set most of them in line with the literature. The parameter ψ
in the price adjustment cost function is chosen such that the parameter κ in the
Phillips curve has about the same value as in models based on the Calvo pricing
assumption. The shock ǫτ
t will be chosen such that it corresponds to an increase
of the value-added tax rate from 16 to 19 percentage points. Time is measured in
quarters. The structural parameter values are thus as follows
β = 0.98; σ = 2;   = 20; ǫ = 11; ψ = 80;
γ = 0.9; τ = 0.16; ρA = 0.9; ρτ = 1.
For the simple interest rate reaction function we set φx = 0.5 and φπ = 1.5.
By its very nature, the tax increase considered here, should be understood as
being permanent. However, strictly speaking, the model being log-linearized around
a non-stochastic steady state only allows for non-permanent – albeit possibly highly
persistent – shocks. Setting the corresponding parameter ρτ in the tax process to a
high value close to one, say 0.99, yields qualitatively the same results as setting it
to 1.0.12 Thus, we stick to the parameterization that corresponds to a permanent
tax change.
The top panels of the following graphs document the reaction of inﬂation, ac-
tual output, and the one-period interest rate. The bottom panels show the output
12In particular we do not have ‘discontinuities’ when moving from the highly persistent to the
scenario with a truly permanent tax change.
15gap with respect to the eﬃcient level of output (which is relevant for monetary pol-
icy), the output gap with respect to the natural rate of output (which is useful to
understand the driving forces of inﬂation), and the natural rate of output itself.13
First consider Figure 1. It shows the case of a completely ﬂexible labor market,
that is, in the absence of real wage rigidity. The economy adjusts immediately to
the new long-run level of output when the tax change occurs.14 The reason is that
the fall in the marginal revenue product of labor instantly translates into real wages.
In turn, households reduce their labor supply, which, from the production function,
leads to a fall in output. The new level of output is lower because of the increased
tax distortion. The eﬃcient output gap falls (i.e., becomes more negative) along
with actual output. It does so by exactly that amount that compensates the tax
shock in the Phillips curve, thereby leaving inﬂation unaﬀected. There is response
of monetary policy.
13Note that we abuse notation here by denoting the welfare gap with x
∗, not   x. This is not to be
confused with the steady state deviation.
14Again, when writing expressions such as ‘the new long-run level’, we interpret highly persistent
changes as if they were permanent.
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Figure 1: Eﬀect of a tax change – with monetary policy following a simple rule; no
real wage rigidity
17These eﬀects diﬀer strongly in the presence of real wage rigidity, as shown in
Figure 2. Inﬂation rises, and the output gap falls. The intuition is that the downward
adjustment of the real wage is sluggish, so that, for ﬁrms, even though labor costs
do fall, they rise relative to marginal revenue. This cost push induces ﬁrms to
increase their prices, resulting in a rise in inﬂation. As real wages fall, labor supply
is reduced. However, there is an additional eﬀect due to the fall in labor demand
after the tax rise. This further decreases the real wage. In fact, output – and with it
labor input – need to fall by enough so that the real wage equals the new marginal
revenue. With the assumed equation for the real wage adjustment, this can only
happen with a strong fall in the marginal rate of substitution of labor. This, in turn,
is only possible if output falls by enough. Hence the drop in output beyond the new
long-run level. Overall, the tax shock in this case generates positive inﬂation for
approximately two years.
The response of monetary policy is an increase in interest rates. The adjustment
of the nominal rate follows the Taylor principle: it rises by more than inﬂation to
bring about a rise in the real interest rate. Otherwise, inﬂation would rise by even
more, and the model may not have a determinate equilibrium. Finally, a look at the
lower panel further illustrates the driving forces of the adjustment. The natural rate
of output yn falls signiﬁcantly and by more than actual output. This results in the
rising output gap xn, which causes inﬂation to rise. However, from the perspective
of monetary policy, the welfare relevant output gap is that between actual output
and the eﬃcient level of output. This gap is much less volatile. Therefore, rather
than pushing up the interest rate strongly to close the natural output gap xn, the
central bank has an incentive to lower interest rates, to give some stimulus to actual
output. This eﬀect of course is oﬀset by the interest rate response to rising inﬂation.
The previous cases may well be a realistic description of central bank behavior
(given the empirical success of simple Taylor rules). But it is not necessarily optimal
from a welfare-theoretic point of view. As discussed earlier, monetary policy should
be chosen optimally based on a welfare criterion that is based on the parameters
that describe the structure of the model. Furthermore, this optimal choice of policy
should be based on a commitment that the central will behave in a particular way.
Figure 3 shows the behavior of the economy in response to the tax increase under
the central bank’s commitment to the inﬂation-targeting criterion derived earlier.
Remember that the central bank adjusts interest rates such that current inﬂation
is inversely related to the change in the welfare relevant output gap, and positively
related to expected changes in that output gap. We consider the case of real wage
rigidity only, as the results for ﬂexible wages are essentially the same as with the
simple interest rate rule without real wage rigidity.
In contrast to the interest rule, the optimal monetary policy leads to an ad-
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Figure 2: Eﬀect of a tax change – with monetary policy following a simple rule; with
real wage rigidity
justment of inﬂation that reverts much faster back to steady state after about four
quarters. In fact, inﬂation even becomes negative for some time after that, reversing
some of the price level increase that followed the higher inﬂation. This result is
close to the ﬁnding of Woodford (2003) and others15, that optimal monetary policy
under commitment eﬀectively involves price level targeting, rather than inﬂation
targeting. This serves to most eﬀectively anchor inﬂation expectations, which, via
the New Keynesian Phillips curve, determine current inﬂation. Thus, the reduction
in inﬂation can be brought about by a much lower increase in interest rates than
before.
At the same time, the level of output appears to have its strongest decline in
the second quarter, rather than the ﬁrst, but ﬁnds its way up to the new, lower,
15See also Gali (2003) and Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (1999).
19steady state after about 6 quarters. Even though barely noticeable, output is even
slightly above the long-run level. Interestingly, the initial response of the interest
rate is slightly negative rather than positive. This eﬀect arises from the nature of
the targeting rule.
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Figure 3: Eﬀect of a tax change – with optimal monetary policy; with real wage
rigidity
206 Conclusion
The optimal monetary policy response to a value added tax change is derived and
contrasted with the behavior under a simple Taylor-type interest rate rule. The
welfare-maximizing central bank commits to an inﬂation rule that helps manage
expectations and thus allows a containment of inﬂation with lower cost. We have
derived this result in a standard New Keynesian monetary model with distortionary
taxes, which – in conjunction with real wage rigidity – generates a cost push shock
term in the Phillips curve. Furthermore, it induces inﬂation inertia. This approach
diﬀers from the literature which assumes inﬂation inertia exogenously, and intro-
duces cost push shocks in an ad hoc manner. While this may be suitable for charac-
terizing the trade-oﬀ that monetary policy faces in stabilizing inﬂation and output,
a stronger microfoundation as considered here allows a meaningful welfare analysis.
The analysis helps to understand key macroeconomic eﬀects of changes in dis-
tortionary taxes. It also highlights the central role of real wage rigidity for the
adjustment of the economy. If wages setters would accept the inevitability of the
long-run change in output that arises from the tax increase, the adjustment would
take place at even lower cost. In our analysis, we have held other aspects of ﬁscal
policy constant, which may oﬀset the short run eﬀects of the tax change. We leave
this to future work.
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